NOTION AND KYZIKOS: THE SOURCES COMPARED

IT has long been seen that there were two distinct versions current in antiquity of the course of events after the late summer of 411, when Thucydides' *History* comes to its abrupt end.[1] Xenophon's version survives in the original, but the alternative is preserved continuously only in Diodoros' epitome, generally brief and often distorted, and it can now be taken as established that this depends on the work of Ephoros, composed in the middle of the fourth century. For much of the time the two versions are most obviously distinguished by small differences of detail, numbers of ships or of casualties or the like, but often enough the divergence is more radical, and in such cases, down to this century, preference was usually though not invariably given to Xenophon as the contemporary source. Since the publication of the London fragments of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* it has been apparent that Ephoros made use of this work, written by a historian of high quality who was at least nearly contemporary with the events he described; and there has been much controversy over (e.g.) the irreconcilable accounts of Agesilaos' campaign towards Sardis in the summer of 395, in *Hell.Oxy.* 11 (with Diod. xiv 80) and in Xen. *Hell.* iii 4.20–4. The publication of the Florentine fragments by Bartoletti in 1949[2] invited us to compare divergent accounts of the Ionian War. The comparison is most conveniently begun with the battle of Notion, for which a substantial fragment of the non-Xenophontine version is found in *Hell.Oxy.* 4, and we can now more clearly see how the accounts of Xen. *Hell.* i 5.12–14 and Diod. xiii 71[3] came to take the form they have. For many of the other battles Diodoros relates enough to show that his original differed substantially from Xenophon, but not enough for us to reconstruct that original. For Kyzikos, however, his epitome in 49–51 is much more extensive than usual, and with the help of other sources dependent on Ephoros we can establish much of what the latter wrote; and comparison with Xenophon throws further light on that author's methods. An important new fragment of *Hell.Oxy.* was published by L. Koenen in *Stud.Pap.* xv (1975) 69–76, dealing with Thrasyllos' attack on Ephesos in 409; but here the accounts of Xen. 2.6–10 and Diod. 64.1 are both very scrappy and show no significant divergence. The very full detail of the new fragment calls for a different kind of analysis in some other context.

A word must be said about the now remote genesis of this paper. The section on Notion originated in discussions with Maas and Wade-Gery immediately after the publication of the Florentine fragments. Maas's text of the fragments was published as an appendix to an article by Jacoby in *CQ* xliv (1950), and it implies the view of Antiochos' ambush set out below; Wade-Gery published nothing, and there was nothing on this subject in the papers he left; I do not think that I contributed anything of substance at this stage, though I cannot be sure that I have not added or altered anything later. The section on Kyzikos is my own. I got some idea of the topography from a visit to Bandırma (on the mainland opposite Kyzikos) and Erdek (Artake) in the spring of 1957, and I delivered a lecture on both battles to the Hellenic Society in London in March 1962. My hope then was to incorporate this material in a more extended survey of the sources for the period after 411, which in the event was postponed for the sake of the commentary on Thucydides; but as the revision of the *Cambridge Ancient History* approaches the Ionian War, it seems desirable to set out now the detailed argument which would be inappropriate there.

I. NOTION

The first task is to determine what can be deduced from the papyrus fragment. In its upper

---

[1] My thanks are due to D. M. Lewis, who read the penultimate draft of this paper and made helpful suggestions; to P. M. Fraser for help with the geographers; to Dr S. Mitchell for topographical advice; and to Marion Cox for drawing the map.

[2] For his revised views see his Teubner edition of 1959, where the parallel passages from other authors are most usefully collected.

[3] Hereafter references to Diodoros are to Book xiii, and references to Xenophon to *Hellenica* Book i.

part less than half of each line is preserved; I print 1–17 in Maas' text, which sets this out more clearly than Bartoletti's Teubner edition, which also contains one certainly mistaken restoration.

$$- - - - -$$

νησιδ[∗(∗)∗]σπερ ειω[θει — — —
ρας εκπ[ε]μπειν ν[— — —
αυτας πληρωσας τρ[ιηρεις δεκα τας αριστα
5   πλεουσας τας μεν ε∗[— — — ναυ-
λοχειν, έως αν απαρω[σιν — — —
ων πορρω της γης, α[υτος δε — — —
επλει προς την Εφεσ[ον — — — —
προ{σ}αξομενος αυτα[ς. Λυσανδρος δε κατι-
10   δων αυτους τρεις ν̣α[— — — —
περ και προτερον αυ[— — — —
καταδυουσι τον Α[ν]τ[ιοχο — — —
ως και διαφθειρου[σι — — — —
μεν Αθηναιων ο[ἱ — — — ναυλοχουν-
15   τες ευθεως προς τα̣[— — — ου
προνοουμενοι τ[ο να]υμα̣[χησαι κατα κρα-
τος.

From 4 πληρώσας to 9 αὐτά[ς the subject is certainly Antiochos. The restoration in 4 is due to Diodoros' δέκα δὲ ναῦς ⟨τὰς⟩ ἀρίστας πληρώσας (71.2), and confirmed by the papyrus' later reference (21) to an Athenian δεκαναΐαν. Diodoros continues καὶ τὰς μὲν ἄλλας τοῖς τριηράρχοις παραγγείλας ἑτοίμας ἔχειν, ἂν ἦ χρεία ναυμαχεῖν, and as the text runs the 'others' must be the ships that stayed behind at Notion; but this can hardly be right, for in all versions of the battle, including Diodoros' own, these ships at Notion are found totally unprepared when they were needed in the final stage. Bartoletti nevertheless understood his τὰς μὲν ἐτ[έρας ἐκέλευσε ναυ]λοχεῖν (5–6) to refer to these ships, and in 7–8 he restored [αὐτὸς δὲ ταῖς δέκα προ]έπλει, in spite of the fact that in Diod. 71.3 he was caught by Lysandros in a single ship sailing ahead of the ten, while in Xenophon (5.12, cf. Plut. Alc. 35.6, Lys. 5.1) he entered the harbour of Ephesos with only two ships. The alternative is more plausible, that in Diodoros' original 'the others' were the rest of the squadron of ten in contrast to the ship or ships in which Antiochos sailed ahead.[4] Maas at least contemplated the possibility that 5 might be restored τὰς μὲν ἐ[ννέα, but Bartoletti's τὰς μὲν ἐτ[έρας would do as well, and Diodoros' misunderstanding implies that his immediate source used some such wording. The rest of the ten were then to lie in ambush, presumably somewhere fairly close to the harbour of Ephesos, and for this ναυλοχεῖν is appropriate, whereas it does not fit a fleet, prepared or not, some 15 km away at Notion. Maas was surely right to correct the first word of 9 to προαξόμενος: cf. Diodoros' προκαλεσόμενος εἰς ναυμαχίαν.

But if the force in ambush was at most nine ships, the plan cannot have been to take on the whole fleet of Lysandros, nearly 70 ships in Diod. 70.2, a full 90 in Xen. 5.10. We need a smaller victim for the trap and, more speculatively, the papyrus may provide one. In 2–3 someone has been in the habit of sending out ships; restoration could be completed in various ways and it is far from clear what is going on, but the subject of εἰώ[θει could well be Lysandros. The restoration in 9 is almost inevitable, that Lysandros saw Antiochos' movement and (launched) three ships, — —]περ καὶ πρότερον αὐ[- -. Bartoletti wished to connect πρότερον 'ad insequens nomen 'Αντίοχον', but this does not come easily; it is more natural to refer it to something that Lysandros had done 'before', in which case it is likely to be a reference to the 'habit' alleged in 2. That would mean that he had been accustomed to send out a group of three ships, or a number of that order.

---

[4] Bartoletti's mistake was pointed out, and corrected in this sense, by D. Lotze, Abh.Leipz. lvii. 1 (1964) 21 n.3.

No doubt in this version, as in all others (Xen. 5.11, Diod. 71.1), Antiochos had been ordered by Alkibiades not to attack Lysandros, but he nevertheless attempted a minor action. He expected that in some circumstances, not determinable from the papyrus, Lysandros would send out a small group of ships, and Antiochos' plan was to entice them far enough out to sea (6–7) so that his force in ambush could cut them off. The papyrus does not make it clear how the plan went wrong, but Antiochos himself was caught and sunk (12–13).[5] We then turn to the rest of the ten (14–17). Maas thought they retreated, and suggested in 15 πρὸς τἄ[μπαλιν ἐτράπησαν (see Bartoletti's apparatus), but it perhaps makes better sense to have them advance (cf. Xen. 5.13, τῷ ᾽Αντιόχῳ ἐβοήθουν), which gives rather more point to the comment that they did not expect to be involved in a full-scale battle; we may by now be some distance out from the shore, which would help to explain their confidence. Either way, Lysandros now brought out his whole fleet (17–18) and chased them; the main Athenian fleet attempted rescue, failed to man all its ships in time, and fought an unsuccessful battle a little way outside their harbour (18–31). The Spartans took 22 ships, shut the rest up at Notion, raised a trophy, and went away (31–8); the Athenians stayed quiet for the moment, but after two or three days . . . (38–40, where this column of the papyrus ends).

Diodoros has the squadron of ten (above), which is not in Xenophon, and the Athenian losses are 22 ships, not the 15 found in Xenophon. Further, at 71.1 Alkibiades goes off to Klazomenai, not as in Xen. 5.11 to Thrasyboulos at Phokaia, and in *Hell.Oxy.* 3.22 we find]ταῖς Κλα[- -; that is in the column preceding *fr.* 4 and cannot be far from the beginning of that fragment,[6] so this detail too probably came from *Hell.Oxy.* On the other hand, at 71.4 a few of the Athenian crews were captured, but the rest swam to safety: that is not in *Hell.Oxy.*, or at least not at this point in the text, but it is close to Xen. 5.14. Ephoros may well have taken an occasional detail from Xenophon, or from a source in the same tradition, even though he generally follows the non-Xenophontine narrative. Thereafter Diodoros probably returns to the alternative version: in Xen. 5.14–15 the Athenians remove to Samos, to all appearance immediately after the battle, and that is where Alkibiades finds them on his return, whereas in Diod. 71.4 he finds them still at Notion; and the papyrus, though it does not reach that far, has the Athenians remain there for some days.

Diodoros' epitomising is no more reliable here than elsewhere. The misunderstanding implied in 71.2 has been discussed above, but besides he has missed out entirely the middle stage of the battle when Lysandros committed only a few ships (9–13 of the papyrus), of which there is also some reflection in Xen. 5.13. There is more interest in the question what is concealed behind the phrases in which he refers to the intentions of the commanders. At 71.2 we are told that Antiochos was rash by nature, and was eager to perform some spectacular action on his own. This view of his character may, for all we know, have been shared by the Oxyrhynchos historian, but καὶ σπεύδων . . . λαμπρόν looks all too like one of those empty phrases with which Diodoros evades the necessity of explaining something in detail; in fact the papyrus did explain Antiochos' plan, and so perhaps did Ephoros. At 71.3 Lysandros learns from deserters of the absence of Alkibiades and the best of his soldiers, and it sounds as if we were to hear of some action that he took in consequence, but all we get is that 'he thought this an opportunity to perform some action worthy of Sparta'. Note also Pausanias (ix 32.6), who gives Notion as his example of Lysandros' σοφία. Here again Alkibiades' absence is important, and Lysandros chose that moment to lead Antiochos on to believe that he was capable (ἀξιόμαχον) of taking on the Spartan fleet:[7] the σοφία was presumably displayed in his means of luring Antiochos on, but we

[5] Maas did not complete the name ᾽Α[ν]τ[ίοχον, from a doubt whether καταδύω could take a personal object; but cf. Xen. *Anab.* i 3.17, vii 2.13.

[6] Since the exact height of these columns is not known, we cannot be more precise.

[7] This is not what *Hell.Oxy.* 4 implies, but we do not know for certain that Ephoros followed him exactly.

Pausanias does not give a very careful rendering: his battle takes place 'not far from the city of Kolophon', by which he no doubt meant from Notion as the harbour of Kolophon, as restored in the papyrus at 26–7, but he has forgotten that Kolophon looks inland from the other side of the mountain.

are not told what he actually did. All this suggests that the original behind these accounts described some positive plan of Lysandros'. No surviving narrative tells us what it was, but there is room for description in the missing parts of *Hell.Oxy.* 3–4, and it would be permissible to guess that the habit of sending out a small group of ships was an ingredient in the plan.

Xenophon's version (5.11–15) does not so much contradict as lose the sharp focus of the alternative account. Alkibiades here departs for Phokaia, not for Klazomenai, but the initial direction would be the same; his orders to Antiochos are much as in Diodoros. Then, with no attempt at explanation, we have Antiochos sailing with his own ship and another into Ephesos harbour, right under the prows of Lysandros' ships, which we have been told (5.10) were beached. Lysandros at first launched 'a few' ships; the Athenians came to Antiochos' help with 'more' ships, whereon Lysandros brought out his whole fleet, the Athenians from Notion joined in raggedly, and the battle develops as in other accounts. (Curiously, Xenophon never says what happened to Antiochos himself.) But the Athenian losses are here 15 ships, not 22, and after the battle there are the small divergences noted above. As De Sanctis long since observed,[8] this is the battle as seen by a Spartan; we may add, one not senior enough to be in the secret of Lysandros' plans. He saw Antiochos enter the harbour, but he did not understand what he was trying to do, and he did not give a precise number for the ships Lysandros put in at this stage. Next he saw that there were more Athenian ships, but again he did not know why they were there. What followed was plain to see and is common to all versions. It is hard to forgive Xenophon his incurious vagueness, and his neglect of the Athenian side of the matter. The battle was not a decisive defeat for Athens, but it had a political consequence of high importance, the second exile of Alkibiades, and the whole matter must have been fully and heatedly discussed in Athens, surely sometimes in Xenophon's hearing. De Sanctis' further conjecture, that Diodoros' account went back ultimately to the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, is triumphantly vindicated, though the battle as it now emerges is not quite the battle he envisaged.

There remains Plutarch, who in *Alc.* 35.5–8, *Lys.* 5.1–2, mainly follows Xenophon, with embellishment. The former, the fuller account, opens (35.3–5) by speaking of the exaggerated expectations the Athenians had formed of the prospects of Alkibiades' Ionian campaign, then relieves him of blame for leaving the main fleet by explaining that the Athenians had to scrape around for money, while Lysandros was liberally supplied by Kyros. Alkibiades' departure 'towards Karia to collect money' looks like a mere aberration, perhaps[9] a muddled recollection of his excursion there before his return to Athens in 407 (Xen. 4.8–9); *Lys.* 5.1 has him go to Phokaia, as in Xenophon. Antiochos enters the harbour of Ephesos with two ships, as Xen. 5.12, but his behaviour is more luridly described: he went past the prows of Lysandros' ships πολλὰ καὶ πράττων καὶ φθεγγόμενος ἀκόλαστα καὶ βωμολόχα (*Alc.* 35.6, cf. *Lys.* 5.1). This is either Plutarch's own touching-up of Xenophon's sparer story, or an addition by some intervening writer; De Sanctis confidently assumed that it was Theopompos, which may well be right (see below, on Plutarch's version of Kyzikos). For the rest he follows Xenophon fairly closely, and the Athenian losses are here again 15 ships.

We should accept the fuller detail and greater clarity of the *Hell.Oxy.* version, what we have of it; in particular, very considerable weight should be given to the fact that the Oxyrhynchos historian took the trouble to explain the commanders' intentions. It is natural enough that no writer later than this conscientious and near-contemporary analyst should have bothered about Antiochos' plans. At the time the enemies of Alkibiades could help their case by making the worst of the man to whom he had entrusted the fleet, while his friends had not much to gain by exculpating his subordinate,[10] and so no later author known to us even considered the possibility that Antiochos had an intelligible plan. It seems that it was not a rash challenge to an all-out battle, but a limited operation designed to inflict a small loss; and possibly, as Ed. Meyer

[8] *Riv.Fil.* lix (1931) 222–9 = *Studi di storia di storiografia greca* (Florence 1951) 163–71.
[9] Meyer, *GdA* iv² 2.335 n.1, on p. 336.

[10] On Antiochos' standing as κυβερνήτης, cf. M. Amit, *Grazer Beiträge* iii (1975) 9–11.

guessed,[11] to counter a feeling of frustration in the inactive Athenian fleet. That was presumably still a contravention of Alkibiades' order, and no doubt Antiochos ought to have reckoned with the danger that the rest of the fleet might be embroiled in an attempt to rescue him; but at least he was not guilty of the unmotivated idiocy which is all that Xenophon gives us.

We see then what Xenophon might do with an episode which did not interest him as it should have done. We also see the kind of mistake into which Diodoros might fall when he tried to cut down his material—but this is only a general warning, of no specific diagnostic use in other cases.

II. KYZIKOS

Here we do not have the direct evidence of a fragment of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, and it may be best to start with Xenophon's account and the problems it raises, before turning to the alternative version as it appears in Diodoros and elsewhere.

After their success at Abydos the Athenians took the ships they had captured to Sestos (1.7). All but forty ships then scattered outside the Hellespont to collect money (1.8); Tissaphernes came to the Hellespont, arrested Alkibiades, and imprisoned him at Sardis, but after thirty days he escaped to Klazomenai (1.9–10); meanwhile the Athenians had retired to Kardia (on the north shore of the Thracian Chersonese) for fear of Mindaros' sixty ships (1.11). When Alkibiades arrived there with six ships, he learnt that the Peloponnesians had gone to Kyzikos, so he ordered the ships back from Kardia to Sestos. When they came, he was on the point of setting out ὡς ἐπὶ ναυμαχίαν, when Theramenes turned up from Macedon with twenty ships, and Thrasyboulos from Thasos with twenty more (1.11–12). He told them to follow him to Parion (on the south shore of the Propontis, some 30 km east of the entrance to the Hellespont), and there the whole fleet gathered, 86 ships, and set off again during the following night, arriving early next day (περὶ ἀρίστου ὥραν) at Prokonnesos (1.13). There Alkibiades prevented any ship, even the smallest, from leaving harbour, so that no one should report to the enemy the numbers of the Athenian fleet (1.15: it appears not to matter so much that Mindaros should know they were there, but he must not learn of their reinforcement). Next day Alkibiades made a stirring speech (1.14), and set off for Kyzikos, again 'as for a sea-battle', in heavy rain which then cleared to reveal Mindaros exercising his sixty ships, well away from the harbour and cut off by the Athenian movement (1.16). The Peloponnesians fled to the land and from there tried to repel their attackers (1.17).

Xenophon treats the ensuing land-battle very offhandedly. Alkibiades 'sailed round' (περιπλεύσας) with twenty ships and landed. In this version he should to start with be between Mindaros and the harbour; it seems that for some reason he wanted to launch an attack from the other side, but Xenophon makes no attempt to explain this manoeuvre or to describe further operations, adding only that Mindaros also landed and was killed and his troops then fled. The Athenians carried off all the enemy ships to Prokonnesos, except that the Syracusans burnt theirs (1.18).

This is a vivid and powerful story, but it has some peculiar features. (a) Alkibiades' original departure from Sestos, before the appearance of Theramenes and Thrasyboulos, was intended to lead to a battle (12), but at this stage he had only 46 ships to Mindaros' sixty, and he cannot have envisaged a battle at all like that which eventually took place. (b) Perhaps the most worrying point is that the rendezvous at Parion (13) fits very badly with the strict precautions taken at Prokonnesos (15). Parion is between 70 and 80 km from Kyzikos, and some 36 hours were still to elapse before the battle: time enough, one might think, for news of the reinforcement to have reached Mindaros, whatever security measures were taken at Prokonnesos. (c) The battle itself is described as if the encounter had been entirely accidental. We may, if we wish, suppose that

[11] *Op. cit.* (n. 9) 335.

Alkibiades knew where the enemy was and under cover of the rain crept up into a position from which he could dash up and cut them off, but if that was in Xenophon's mind he has merely obscured it. (d) Xenophon's almost total neglect of the land battle is extremely odd, and it raises questions about his source.

Diodoros (49–51) is less spectacular, and the space he has given to the event makes it much easier this time to reconstruct his original: that is, Ephoros, and probably behind him the Oxyrhynchos historian. Here Theramenes, who had set out from Athens with thirty ships (47.6), went to help Archelaos with the siege of Pydna, but when that went on too long he went off to Thrace to join Thrasyboulos.[12] Mindaros towards the end of winter (49.2) collected all the ships he could, and the (unnamed) Athenian generals made off in fear to Kardia. From there they sent triremes to summon Theramenes and Thrasyboulos urgently, and also to Alkibiades with his (here unnumbered) ships from Lesbos (49.2–3: it is not said what he was doing in Lesbos, and there is nothing here about imprisonment at Sardis[13]). Mindaros, with the help of a substantial force brought up by Pharnabazos, captured Kyzikos (49.4). The Athenians decided to sail there, and the fleet halted first at Elaious (at the extreme tip of the Chersonese near C. Helles, from which they were not so likely to be reported). They then took trouble ($\dot{\epsilon}\phi\iota\lambda o\tau\iota\mu\dot{\eta}\theta\eta\sigma\alpha\nu$) to pass Abydos by night so that their numbers might not be observed (49.5: again it seems that it was not their presence that must be concealed, but their reinforcement). From there they went to Prokonnesos (49.6: that is a good 150 km from Elaious and was probably not done in one continuous voyage, but after the care taken in passing Abydos they presumably did not show themselves anywhere nearer to Kyzikos on the Asiatic coast).

The next day they disembarked soldiers under Chaireas on Kyzikene territory, with orders to march towards the city (49.6). That might seem too blatant an intimation to Mindaros that something was afoot, but Frontinus (ii 5.44), following the same version of these operations, says that the troops were landed by night, and it appears in the sequel (below) that they were put ashore at a considerable distance from the city. Next (50.1) they divided the fleet into three. Alkibiades sailed well ahead of the rest (Plut. *Alc.* 28.6 gives him forty ships, a detail he did not get from Xenophon; Diodoros gives no numbers at all for the Athenians[14]); meanwhile Theramenes and Thrasyboulos 'contrived it ($\dot{\epsilon}\phi\iota\lambda o\tau\dot{\epsilon}\chi\nu o\nu\nu$) so that they could circle round the enemy and cut off their retreat towards the city'. The ambush worked: Mindaros saw only Alkibiades' ships, came boldly out to chase them (in this version with eighty ships, not sixty), and was duly caught when Alkibiades reversed his retreat and the others got between the Peloponnesians and the city (50.2–3). Polyainos (i 40.9), evidently working from the same source, gives us a vague ambush and adds no useful detail. Frontinus (*ibid.*), much briefer, does tell us that part of the fleet was hidden *post quaedam promunturia*, which puts a little more body into Diodoros' unhelpful $\dot{\epsilon}\phi\iota\lambda o\tau\dot{\epsilon}\chi\nu o\nu\nu$. It may also be relevant that at the end of his account (51.7) Diodoros says that the Athenians set up a trophy for the sea-battle on the island called 'of Polydoros'. We thus need to find a suitable headland, and an island which would make a suitable setting for a trophy.

Kyzikos stood at the southern tip of the large rugged peninsula now usually referred to as

[12] Thrasyboulos is here (49.1) designated as 'the commander of the whole fleet', but at this stage they have not yet joined up with the main fleet at Kardia. The apparent subordination of Theramenes to Thrasyboulos can hardly be real, and at 50.7 $\pi\alpha\rho\epsilon\kappa\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\acute{\nu}\sigma\alpha\tau o$ does not mean that the latter treated Theramenes as a subordinate during the battle. Thrasyboulos owed his generalship to the sailors' assembly at Samos in the previous summer (Thuc. viii 76.2), Theramenes was presumably appointed by a meeting of the Five Thousand at Athens; Diodoros may have misunderstood some comment in his original on the relations between two sets of generals.

[13] This does not certainly imply that Ephoros left it out, but it is an item that one might have expected to appeal to Diodoros. At Diod. 46.2–3 Alkibiades was in the Hellespont, and it is likely that Ephoros explained at some point how he came to be elsewhere.

[14] At 50.2 Vogel conjectured that the $\kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}$ found in one branch of the MSS. between $\nu\alpha\hat{\nu}s$ and $\mu\acute{o}\nu\alpha s$ should be taken as $\bar{\kappa} = \epsilon\acute{\iota}\kappa o\sigma\iota$, and he referred to Xen. 1.18. R.J. Littman, *TAPA* xcix (1968) 267 and 269 n.6, treats this as if it were the established text, but Vogel's conjecture is not very plausible. As to the fact, Plutarch's forty ships would be more likely to draw out the whole fleet of Mindaros, and Littman 269 sensibly prefers this figure.

FIG. 1: Kyzikos and Prokonnesos.

Arktonnesos.[15] In the fifth century this was probably not joined to the mainland by a solid isthmus,[16] but Kyzikos nevertheless had two distinct harbours, east and west, and we have to ask in which direction Mindaros was tempted out. The eastern direction can almost certainly be ruled out. The S.E. coast of Arktonnesos is too open to hide a large incoming fleet,[17] so that the ambush station would have to be well round the N.E. corner, on the north shore; and at the corner there are some small islands, one of which could be Polydoros'. The distances involved make this implausible, but a little to the west of the city there is an obvious site for an ambush, behind the promontory and hill which separate Kyzikos from the smaller town of Artake on the S.W. shore of Arktonnesos. The promontory is high enough, so that a fleet approaching from Prokonnesos would not be visible either from Kyzikos itself or from the mainland opposite, till it rounded the point south of Artake, to which Strabo (xii 8.11, 576) gives the name ἀκρωτήριον Μέλανος, which ships sailing from Kyzikos to Priapos must pass. A fleet would however be visible to lookouts posted on the heights of Arktonnesos, a precaution Mindaros might be expected to have taken if he knew that the enemy was in the neighbourhood.[18] But the answer to this may be the weather: Xenophon's rainstorm is presumably not mere fiction, and under cover of this Thrasyboulos and Theramenes could get into position unobserved (how far the weather on that day was predictable is a question we cannot answer). Further, there is a single island off the point, small but relatively high, a conspicuous site for a trophy. The tangled question whether this island can be identified with the Polydora of Pliny and Stephanos is discussed in the Appendix; the evidence is certainly not clear enough to rule out the possibility.

Mindaros, his retreat cut off, had to flee to the land, at the point called Kleroi where Pharnabazos' force was (50.4). Alkibiades eagerly pursued, but when he tried to drag away the

[15] Ancient writers use Kyzikos for the name of the 'island' as well as the city. Pliny NH v 40.142 gives Arctonnesus as an earlier name for Cyzicus; Stephanos s.vv. Ἄρκτων νῆσος and Κύζικος probably means the same by his ἐκαλεῖτο; cf. also Ap. Rhod. i 941. Hirschfeld, RE ii (1896) 1172, remarked that Arktonnesos for the whole peninsula is a modern usage; but it is convenient to have a distinct name for the peninsula, and the usage is likely to continue, as here.

[16] The question is most thoroughly discussed by Ruge, RE xii (1925) 228 f.

[17] Dr Mitchell confirms my impression, formed without very close inspection.

[18] This point was put to me by G. S. Kirk after the lecture referred to on p. 15. It applies of course to an ambush of any kind, not only one at Artake.

ships already beached he got into trouble with the superior Peloponnesian land force and with Pharnabazos' troops (50.5–6). Thrasyboulos landed his *epibatai* to help him, and despatched Theramenes to make contact as fast as possible with Chaireas and his infantry (50.7). Mindaros continued his struggle with Alkibiades, and sent troops with Klearchos, and Pharnabazos' mercenaries, against Thrasyboulos (51.1). The latter was surrounded and in desperate straits when Theramenes appeared with his own men and Chaireas' troops (51.2), and after a fierce battle first the mercenaries gave way, then Klearchos was pushed back (51.3–4), leaving Theramenes free to come to Alkibiades' rescue. Mindaros again divided his forces, half with himself against Alkibiades, half against the newcomers (51.5). In the end Mindaros' death led to a general rout (51.6); the Athenians pursued for some distance, but retired to their ships on learning that Pharnabazos was hurrying up with a strong force of cavalry; and they took the city, and set up two trophies, the one already mentioned and another on land where the Peloponnesian rout began (51.7). 51.8 expands the telescopic phrase about the capture of the city, and refers to the captured ships and other spoils.

The original clearly went into very considerable detail, and Koenen's new fragments show the style in which the Oxyrhynchos historian might describe such an action. In Diodoros the outlines are blurred, and there is no lack of the stock phrases that he uses to cover up detail, but he has given us enough for a rough idea of what happened. Though Chaireas had been ordered to march towards the city (49.6), he was evidently still some distance away when the land battle began, and this must be to the west; he had to disembark far enough away to escape notice. He and Theramenes reached Thrasyboulos first, who was therefore on the Athenian right, and until they had disposed of Klearchos they could not rescue Alkibiades, who was therefore on the Athenian left. In the sea-battle, when he turned on his pursuers, Alkibiades must be to the west of the Peloponnesians, but Xenophon's περιπλεύσας might explain the next phase: that is, he circled round the enemy to attack the eastern side of the Peloponnesian position. Thrasyboulos must then have come in to his right, to engage the left wing of the enemy, and that would bring them all to the positions in which Theramenes found them. There is nothing here to suggest error of the kind that Diodoros committed in his account of Notion, but without the text of *Hell.Oxy.* we cannot of course be sure.

Lastly there is Plutarch (*Alc.* 28), who takes much from Xenophon, but this time the differences are not merely a matter of embellishment. His story starts in effect from Prokonnesos (2–3) and does not deal with the earlier movements. The weather is touched up, adding καὶ βροντὰς καὶ ζόφον to Xenophon's rain, and the Athenians are in despair till Alkibiades makes them embark (4). The weather soon clears, to reveal the Peloponnesian fleet in front of the harbour (5), but then we get a sort of shadow of the ambush (6–7); Alkibiades feared that if the Peloponnesians saw the whole fleet they would escape εἰς τὴν γῆν,[19] so he ordered the rest to hold back while he went ahead with forty ships to challenge the enemy, who were duly deceived and defeated. Alkibiades' twenty ships figure again (8, *cf.* Xen. 1.18), but apart from this the land battle is as much neglected here as in Xenophon.

This then looks like a not very effective conflation of Xenophon and the original of the Ephoran version. It is not likely to be the work of Plutarch himself, whose interest is all in the dramatic detail; he could not of course resist the famous Spartan despatch captured after the battle (10, *cf.* Xen. 1.23). The most likely intermediary is Theopompos: cf. *Alc.* 32.2 for the writers whom Plutarch regarded as standard authorities for this period. Theopompos often followed Xenophon very closely (*cf.* Porphyry, cited at *FGrH* 115 F 21), but his work was much fuller, as the fragments of his *Hellenica* show, and it is not impossible that he should have tried to work in matter from the alternative version. The forty ships with which Alkibiades lured Mindaros on may be a genuine detail from that account: Diodoros is merely vague, Polyainos

---

[19] This is not happily expressed, for it was 'to the land' that they retreated from the actual sea-battle. Probably Plutarch's original meant that Mindaros was not yet far enough out to be cut off (*cf.* Plutarch's πρὸ τοῦ λιμένος), and it was feared that he would escape back safely into the harbour.

and Frontinus speak of 'a few' ships. If this is from Theopompos, the latter is also probably responsible for the detail added to Xenophon's account of Notion (above).

Xenophon does not come very well out of this battle either. His version is dramatic enough, and his imagination was evidently fired by this picture of Alkibiades dashing up from the south and galvanising everyone into the action which they seem unable to take till he arrives; all this could be from a single source which he did not test against the stories of other informants. The more sober version is the more plausible, in which the Athenian generals left at Sestos, when forced to take refuge at Kardia, took immediate steps to ensure that the Hellespont was not left for too long in Mindaros' control. The assembly of the whole fleet at Kardia leaves time for the commanders to think what they are going to do, whereas Xenophon's breakneck speed allows for hardly any planning, and his assembly of the fleet at Parion looks like a mere mistake. If his source knew anything of the manoeuvres that immediately preceded the battle, he left that on one side and described the main action as if the encounter had been purely accidental. To explain his extraordinary treatment of the fighting on land, one might guess that he took the whole story from a single informant, who did not land but stayed to mind his ship: not a man from Alkibiades' squadron, who would have known what he was doing, nor from that of Theramenes, for then he would have seen a little more of the land operations, but perhaps from Thrasyboulos' group, one who saw only that when they came out from Artake they were between Mindaros and the harbour, and that Thrasyboulos then landed. If he was with the latter at Thasos, he was not present at Kardia when the generals sent out to collect the scattered Athenian forces. He must in any case be a partisan of Alkibiades, whom he credited with more than his proper share in the victory.

De Sanctis called for a general re-examination of the Ionian War, to redress the balance between Xenophon and Diodoros. The pity is that Diodoros never again gives us such full detail as he presents in 49–51. Most of all, perhaps, one would like to have in full the alternative version of Aigospotamoi: the opening of 106.1 very strongly suggests that on that day Philokles had determined to do something different from what the Athenians had done on previous days, but we are not allowed to know what his plan was,[20] and the rest of the chapter only reveals that this version of the battle was very different from Xenophon's. As Koenen remarks (p. 66), the new fragments attest once more the popularity of the work of the Oxyrhynchos historian; though his history did not reach the medieval copyists, we may yet hope for more.

New College, Oxford   A. ANDREWES

APPENDIX: ISLANDS OFF KYZIKOS

(a) Plin. *NH* v 32.44: *insulae in Propontide ante Cyzicum Elaphonnesus, unde Cyziceum marmor, eadem Neuris et Proconnesus dicta. secuntur Ophiusa, Acanthus, Phoebe, Scopelos, Porphyrione, Halone cum oppido, Delphacie, Polydora, Artacaeon cum oppido.*

Schol. Ap. Rhod. ii 279, after various etymologies of Prokonnesos: ὑπό τινων δὲ ⟨ἡ⟩ Προκόννησος καὶ Ἐλαφόννησος ἐκλήθη.

(b) Stephanos s.v. Βέσβικος = FGrH 474 F 2: νησίδιον περὶ Κύζικον, ὡς Διογένης ὁ Κυζικηνὸς ἐν πρώτῃ, †τῶν ἑπτὰ περὶ τῆς πατρίδος νήσων λέγων. 'Προκόννησος καὶ †Φοίβη καὶ Ἁλώνη καὶ Φυσία καὶ Ὀφιοῦσσα καὶ Βέσβικος, γόνιμοι καὶ λιπαραί'. For the text see Jacoby *ad loc.* Diogenes is dated to the early Byzantine period. It is not very likely that he wrote seven books about these islands, or that this is the first of a number of books about seven islands; to make up seven we must either include Kyzikos itself as an island (n. 14 above), or, as Jacoby tentatively suggested, add Φοινίκη which appears as a MS. variant for Φοίβη.

(c) Skylax 94: . . . κατὰ ταύτην (Artake) νῆσός ἐστι καὶ πόλις Προκόννησος καὶ ἑτέρα νῆσος εὐλίμενος Ἐλαφόννησος· γεωργοῦσι δ' αὐτὴν Προκοννήσιοι.

(d) Stephanos has separate entries for Ἁλώνη (for which he gives Νευρίς and Προχώνη as alternative names), Ἐλαφόννησος, Πολυδώρα, Προκόννησος, which add nothing very distinctive.

[20] C. Ehrhardt, *Phoenix* xxiv (1970) 225–8, drew attention to the incompatibility of the two accounts, but inevitably failed to make much out of the incomplete data provided by Diodoros.

Correlation between the two main lists, (a) and (b), is far from complete. Pliny's Acanthus, Scopelos, Porphyrione, and Delphacie appear nowhere else and offer no handhold for identification; Stephanos' Physia likewise appears only here, but of all the names on offer it is nearest to Aphisia, the modern Greek name for the more westerly of the two larger islands in the group south of Prokonnesos. The marble quarries mercifully leave no doubt of the identity of Prokonnesos. Otherwise the nearest to a certainty is Halone as the other large island in the group; this is its modern name, a case can be made for saying that it has borne the name continuously, and there are some remains of Pliny's *oppidum* (Hasluck 35; Bürchner, *RE* vii [1912] 2279–80). It is likely enough that Halone should also be equated with the Elaphonnesos of Skylax (Leaf, *Strabo on the Troad* 90; *ATL* i 542); the combination of good harbours and farming land suits no other island so well, and with these advantages it should be fitted somehow into Diogenes' list (*cf.* γόνιμοι). It has also been suggested (*ibid.*) that Halone is the 'Old Prokonnesos' of Strabo xiii 1.16, 588, curiously described as ἐν τῷ παράπλῳ from Parion to Priapos; if the original settlement had been on Halone/Elaphonnesos, that would help to explain Pliny (above), and they seem to have the alternative name Neuris in common.[21] For the rest, the best hope is that Pliny's series is in topographical order, from Prokonnesos south and then west to east; his '*secuntur*' ought to mean this, and the identification of Halone is compatible with such an order.

That raises the question whether Pliny's Artacaeon is Artake. A topographical order would point that way, and no other site in the neighbourhood would be likely to support an *oppidum*; but the town probably disappeared some centuries before Pliny's time, and when it existed it was not on an island separate from that of Kyzikos. Artake is well documented down to the end of the fifth century (Hdt. iv 14.2, vi 33.2; Soph. *fr.* 831 N²; *ATL*; etc.), but thereafter it disappears[22] till we find it in Procop. *Bell.Pers.* i 25.31 as a suburb (προάστειον) of Kyzikos. It was probably absorbed into Kyzikos early in the fourth century, an earlier victim than Prokonnesos, which Athens claims to have rescued from Kyzikos in the 360's (Dem. [l]5, *cf.* xviii 302), but Paus. viii 46.4 shows that it succumbed in the end. There is evidence to suggest that there was no town of Artake in the third century. Stephanos s.v. describes Artake first as a city of Phrygia, a colony of Miletos, then cites Timosthenes[23] as saying that Artake was both a mountain in the territory of Kyzikos, and a small island one stade away from the land; and here there was a deep harbour for eight ships ὑπὸ τῷ ἀγκῶνι, ὃν ποιεῖ τὸ ὄρος ἔχεσθαι τοῦ αἰγιαλοῦ; Strabo xii 3.11, 576, adds some other detail but does not describe the harbour. To add to the confusion, Pliny *NH* v 40.141, moving along the south shore of the Propontis, inserts between the Granikos and Kyzikos *Artace portus ubi oppidum fuit*; whatever the cause of this displacement, the passage confirms the impression given by Timosthenes that at some period there was no town of Artake beside the harbour which he describes.

Pliny thus had authority for taking Artake either as a town or as an island,[24] and he may well have

---

[21] In this deer-laden context Meineke's alteration of Stephanos' text to Νεβρίς is attractive, but Pliny's Neuris tells against it.

[22] When Anaximenes (*FGrH* 72 F 26) includes Artake among the colonies of Miletos, that tells us nothing about its status in his own time. Eudoxos (*fr.* 336 Lasserre) is more problematic. Strabo xiii 1.4, 582, reports controversy over the extent of Aiolis and the Troad: Homer started the Troad from the Aisepos, Eudoxos ἀπὸ Πριάπου καὶ Ἀρτάκης τοῦ ἐν τῇ Κυζικηνῶν νήσῳ χωρίου ἀνταίροντος τῷ Πριάπῳ, reducing its extent. As it stands this is 'plain nonsense', as Leaf (*Strabo* 47) robustly put it, for Artake is the wrong side of the Aisepos for Eudoxos' argument. F. Gisinger, *Die Erdbeschreibung des Eudoxos von Knidos* (Leipzig 1921) 65, suggested that Artake was brought in to fix the position of Priapos more precisely: Strabo uses ἀνταίρειν to locate a place on the same latitude as another (*LSJ* s.v. II.2) and Artake is nearly due east of Priapos, but it is not clear how this information would help, and if this was what Eudoxos meant Strabo's wording is very misleading. F. Lasserre, *Die Fragmente des Eudoxos von Knidos* (Berlin 1966) 244, refers to Strabo vii *fr.* 58 and suggests that the argument was really about the eastern limit of the Hellespont; but the

controversies in vii and xiii appear to be quite distinct and I see no good reason to amalgamate them. More probably καὶ Ἀρτάκης ... τῷ Πριάπῳ is an addition by Strabo, or (as Leaf thought) an interpolation, in which case there is no evidence that Eudoxos mentioned Artake or that it was still extant in his time. Artake may have revived in some degree in the Hellenistic period. There are many grave inscriptions said (with various degrees of authority) to come from Erdek in E. Schwertheim, *Inschr. gr. Städte aus Kleinasien* xviii, *Kyzikos* i (Bonn 1980), and if they were a safe guide the revival might have started in the second century BC (his nos 146, 330).

[23] Of Rhodes, an officer of Ptolemy Philadelphos, whose main geographical work was *On Harbours*: see P. M. Fraser, *Ptolemaic Alexandria* (Oxford 1972) i 522, 536–7. E. A. Wagner, *Die Erdbeschreibung des Timosthenes von Rhodos* (Leipzig 1888) 55, contributes nothing for my present question.

[24] Even the less plausible MS. readings end in *-aeon* or *-eon*, suggesting a Greek genitive plural: does something like Ἀρτακαίων νῆσος lie behind this? The regular ethnic is Ἀρτακηνός, as in the tribute lists, but Stephanos cites Sophokles for Ἀρτακεύς and Demosthenes Bithynos (*fr.* 6 Powell) for Ἀρτάκιος.

combined the data rather more hazily than Stephanos, who gives his citation from Timosthenes as an alternative to the description of Artake as a city; there can never have been a town on Timosthenes' island, which is firmly identified by its short distance from the shore. Equally, if one of Pliny's sources meant the same island by Polydora, it is unsurprising that he should have put this in too; and if the order is topographical, we do not want too many names for the stray islets between Halone and Artake. The case for the identification is not strong. For Timosthenes and in the parallel passage of Strabo, the name of the island is Artake, but in the days when Artake was the name of the city the inhabitants may well have had another name for the island. Again, Stephanos (s.v.) gives his Polydora an ethnic, Πολυδωρεύς; that is unsuitable for the island off Artake, but an island inhabited enough to rate an ethnic would be some distance away from any likely site for the sea-battle, and Stephanos may simply have been run away with by his obsession with ethnics.[25] The evidence of the geographers does not settle the question, which island the source of Diodoros meant by the 'island of Polydoros'.[26] It remains true that Artake is the most likely site for the ambush.

[25] It is hard to feel much confidence in Πολυποδουσσαῖος, known only from Stephanos, the next entry after Polydora.

[26] Neither Priam's son, nor any other Polydoros in legend or history, appears to have any known connection with this region.